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lOb-5

Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
The liability of an outside director to respond in damages for
violations of rule lOb-51 committed by his co-directors recently came
2
under close scrutiny by the Second Circuit. In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
the court sitting en banc, decided 6-4 that "a director in his capacity
as a director (a non-participant in the transaction) owes no duty to
insure that all material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the corporation on whose board he
sits." 3 More significantly, the court held that "no violation of rule
lOb-5 occurs 'in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing
use of a device, scheme or artiface to defraud. It is insufficient to allege
mere negligence.'
The case involved a merger between BarChris Construction Corporation (BarChris) and Victor Billard Company (Victor) on December 14, 1961. BarChris was a manufacturer of bowling alleys and
equipment. BarChris' practices of extending credit to customers after
a comparatively small down payment, and making sale and leaseback
arrangements, required that the corporation have a large amount of
cash to finance construction. In 1961 Bertram D. Coleman joined the
"4

I Rule

lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970):

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange.

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were

made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
2479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
3 Id. at 1289.
4 Id. at 1304-05, quoting Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d
Cir. 1971). In Shemtob, the plaintiff had maintained a stock account with the defendant
brokerage house. The value of the stock dropped to the point where it was no longer
adequate to secure the margin requirements set by agreement. As a result, the defendant
liquidated the account and plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of rule lOb-5. It
was argued that the defendant had failed to sell out the account promptly, thus causing
the plaintiff increased losses. Also, the sale was alleged to be improper, since it was made
by defendant without first giving the plaintiff an opportunity to post additional margin.
The court felt that such allegations amounted to no more than a breach of contract
action and could not rise to the level of lOb-5 violations without allegations of scienter
or fraud. In the absence of such allegations, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.
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board of directors of BarChris in connection with a debenture offering
to raise needed capital. Coleman was a partner in Drexel g&Co., the
brokerage firm underwriting the offering.
The Victor-BarChris merger came about through negotiations
which began in March, 1961 between Kircher, treasurer and director
of BarChris, and Shulman, an accountant representing Victor. On
November 6, the BarChris board approved the necessary exchange
of stock and empowered two directors to enter into an acquisition
with the Victor shareholders. On November 21, the acquisition contract was approved. Coleman did not attend the November 6 meeting
and knew nothing about the proposed merger until he received the
minutes of the meeting in the mail. He attended the November 21
meeting and voted in favor of the acquisition but did not attend the
closing on December 14.5
In addition to certain oral misrepresentations made by Kircher,
there was false or misleading information contained in the 1960 BarChris annual report, the 1961 debenture prospectus, and BarChris'
financial statement for the first six months of 1961, all of which were
given to Shulman during the negotiations. Essentially these documents
failed to disclose certain anticipated losses of BarChris due to failures
of its customers to whom unsecured loans were made. It was not until
a special meeting of the BarChris board on December 6 that Coleman
became aware of the serious problems in BarChris, but even then he
did not realize their extent. 6 He generally accepted the explanations
of the other board members.7 At no time did he know of the false
picture presented to the Victor shareholders. 8
The plaintiffs sought to hold Coleman liable for negligence and
to hold Drexel & Co. liable as a controlling person under section 20(a)
5 479 F.2d at 1283-87.
6 This was the "point of crisis" meeting, at which BarChris's corporate problems were
highlighted. At this meeting Coleman recommended that an outside consultant be brought
in to help straighten out the internal affairs. Id. at 1286-88.
7 Reliance by directors on the reports of others relating to the corporations' financial
condition is not uncommon. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963). which
permits directors, when acting in good faith in discharging their duties, to "rely upon
financial statements of the corporation represented to them to be correct by the president
or the officer of the corporation having charge of its books of accounts ....
" It is also
proper for the board of directors to delegate some of its authority to executive committees
comprised of a portion of the total directors of the company, The committee's reports may
then be relied upon by the remaining directors. Based on such reliance, in delegated
matters, a committee member will be held to stricter standards of liability than a nonmember director. See Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 290, 131 NY.S. 1059, 1066
(3d Dep't 1911); Syracuse Television Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 273
N.YS.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1966).
8 479 F.2d at 1287-89.
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).9 At a non-jury trial
before District Judge Frankel, the defendant Coleman was held not
liable to plaintiffs under either rule lOb-5 or section 20(a).10
This decision was appealed to the Second Circuit where it was
heard en banc. Judge Moore, speaking for the majority, framed the
issue as "[w]hat duty, if any, does rule lOb-5 impose on a director
in Coleman's position to insure that all material, adverse information
is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the corporation's stock where
the director does not know that these prospective purchasers are not
receiving all such information?"" In finding no such duty,12 the court
relied on the common law, the legislative history of the Securities
Acts, case law developments under these Acts, and public policy.
At common law a director could not be held liable to the purchasers for the fraud or negligence of others in connection with the
sale of securities no matter how negligent he was in his inattentiveness
to his own company's affairs.'2 The court noted that this was due to
the idea that "a director's first loyalty must be to the shareholders of
the company on whose board he sits,"'" and not to those of a company
with whom his company is negotiating.
In construing rule lOb-5 through the history of the Securities Acts,
the court noted that section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act),' 5 which makes a signer of a registration statement liable for
9 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970):

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provsion of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person isliable, unless the controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
10 The holding of the district court was reiterated by the Second Circuit, 479 F.2d at
1280.
1id.at 1289.
12 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
13 See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), where a director was deemed to be
exempt from liability although he had failed to read circulars sent to prospective purchasers of the corporation's stock. The circulars had been prepared by another and were
shown to be fraudulent. The court felt it unnecessary for the director to compare the
information contained therein to the true facts. One author has noted "non-participation
in the issuance of a prospectus or circular has been for directors a quite invulnerable
armor against civil liability." Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE LJ.
227, 241 (1933).
14 479 F.2d at 1293.
15 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). This section relates to civil liability in connection with false
registration statements and provides, inter alia, that any person who signs a registration
statement can be sued but that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section no person, other
than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden
of proof ...that ...he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground
to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
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misrepresentation, allows a defense of due diligence. Section 11 only
applies to public offerings. Looking to section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 6
which applies to private offerings as well, the court observed that directors could be held liable only if they were participants in the transaction or if there was scienter.17 The court interpreted this as evidencing
a congressional intent that the duties of directors in a private offering
would be less than those in public offerings.'3 To extend a duty of due
diligence to directors under rule lOb-5 would be to ignore this congressional intent by nullifying "the private offering exemption and...
became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statement therein not misleading ....
Id. at § 77k(b)(3). The leading decision concerning the due diligence defense is Escott
v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In that action, purchasers of
corporate debentures brought suit against several parties. Among the defendants were both
inside and outside directors. The plaintiffs showed that a prospectus included in a registration statement omitted material information and set forth substantially misstated data in
an unaudited financial statement. The court considered the liability of each class of defendants separately. None of the inside directors presented evidence of any investigation
of the facts set forth in the registration statement. Thus, they were unable to meet the
du,. diligence requirement. The outside directors were also held liable since they had failed
to use "that reasonable care to investigate the facts which a prudent man would employ in
the management of his own property." Id. at 688.
The BarChris decision leads one court to note that the requirements of due diligence
vary from one director to another.
Inside directors with intimate knowledge of corporate affairs and of the particular
transactions will be expected to make a more complete investigation and have
more extensive knowledge of facts supporting or contradicting inclusions in the
registration statements than outside directors.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See
Comment, BarChris: Easing the Burden of "Due Diligence" under Section 11, 117 U. PA.
L REv. 735 (1969); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1411
(1968).
16 15 U.S.C. § 77(2) (1970):
Any person who ...
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section
77c of this title.. .), by the use of any means or instrument of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the'light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be-liable to the person purchasing such security from him ... .
17 479 F.2d at 1298. As to scienter, the court in Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272
(2d Cir. 1967), felt that within section 12(2) "some form of the traditional scienter requirement . . . is preserved." However, it has been noted that the section is significantly similar
both in wording and effect to the due diligence defense of section 11. See Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts, the BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199 (1969).
The participation required for section 12(2) protection need not be confined to the

immediate seller. In Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960), a cause of action
under this section arose against a director who helped falsify a financial statement used to
induce the plaintiffs to buy certain securities.
s 479 F.2d at 1299.
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the limitation of the due diligence duty to registration statements."'19
Moreover, it would also nullify section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, which
places liability on a person who is in control of a violator of the Securities Acts but allows such a controlling person to raise the defense
of good faith. The court reasoned that the congressional intent in
enacting this section was to hold liable "only ... those directors...
who are in some meaningful sense culpable participants in the fraud
perpetuated by controlled persons." 20
The court next proceeded to explore the development of case law
imposing liability for omissions on directors under the Securities Acts.
The cases examined relied primarily on section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
or section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. In Mader v. Armel,21 the plaintiff
sought to hold two directors liable under section 20(a). The Sixth Circuit held that one was not a controlling person and that the other,
though a controlling person, had established a defense of good faith.
In Moerman v. Zipco, Inc. 2 2 the plaintiff sued certain officers and
directors under section 12 and rule lOb-5. The case involved material
omissions by one of the officers of the corporation during negotiations
for the sale of a stock subscription to the plaintiff. Although the section
12 claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the officer was found
liable under the rule. The district court further held that the liability
2
of the other directors would rest on section 20 of the 1934 Act. a
In examining case law defining directors' duties under the rule,
the Lanza court gave special attention to Second Circuit precedent. 24
19 Id.
20 Id.
21461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
22 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd on opinion below, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.),

rehearing denied, 430 F.2d 362 (1970). The plaintiff had been told there would only be a
limited number of shareholders in the company. When he mentioned this information
to the firm's president, the officer did not indicate that this was incorrect. As a result,
plaintiff purchased shares in the company. Since the president knew at the time of the
conversation that there would be a large number of shareholders in the firm, he was held
liable under lOb-5.
Plaintiff also tried to have four directors held liable, two of whom also served as
corporate officers. Since he had no prior dealing with these parties, it was necessary to
allege violations of section 20 and to prove control. The court came to the broad conclusion that "persons who act as directors are in control of the corporation." Id. at 447.
However, the defendants were able to avoid liability by showing good faith.
23 Id. at 446.
24479 F.2d at 1301-02. Here the court made a statement which may result in the
limitation of this case to its particular facts and which is seemingly contradictory to some
of the later statements of the court on the issue of scienter. Judge Moore said:
We recognize that participation by a director in the dissemination of false information.., may subject such a director to liability under the Rule. But it is
quite a different matter to hold a director liable in damages for failing to insure
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In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that Coleman would be liable for
negligence under the rule absent any affirmative duty to disclose, the
court focused on the language in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
(TGS).25 There the Second Circuit had stated that,
a review of other sections of the act from which Rule lOb-5 seems to
have been drawn suggests that implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as well as active fraud comports
with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the
Rule. Finally we note that this position is not, as asserted by defendants, irreconcilable with previous language in this circuit because "some form of the traditional scienter requirements," . . .
sometimes defined as "fraud," . . . is preserved. This requirement,

whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard
26

The Lanza court noted that the TGS case was distinguishable in
27
that it concerned an SEC enforcement proceeding for injunction.
However, the court felt that any doubt as to whether scienter would be
required was affirmatively resolved in its later holding in Shemtob v.
28
Shearson, Hammill & Co.

It is submitted that this latter statement by the court was not an
accurate characterization of the law as it existed at the time of the
Lanza case. As Judge Hays noted in his dissenting opinion, it was not
clear whether the Second Circuit had previously required scienter. 29
The first case imposing such a requirement, Fischman v. Raytheon
Manufacturing Co.,30 was later confused by the statement of the TGS
that all material adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the

company's stock absent substantial participation in the concealment or knowledge
of it.
Id. at 1302 (emphasis in original). This implies that unknowing participation in the fraud
will serve as a substitute for scienter. But actual participation would probably subject the
director to liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act if he were unable to show due
diligence. See note 16 supra.
25 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
26 Id. at 855. For a general discussion of the sdenter requirements of lOb-5 see Epstein,
The Scienter Requirements in Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1970); Note,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COMArM. L. REv. 1057 (1969).
27 479 F.2d at 1304. In TCS, three concurring opinions also noted this factor.
28 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
29 479 F.2d at 1318-19.
80 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Raytheon held that misrepresentations contained in a
prospectus and registration statement which could not be sued upon under section 11 by
a purchaser who had not bought registered securities could nevertheless be a basis for a
suit under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lob-5 where the false statements were
allegedly fraudulent. The court stated that "proof of fraud is required in suits under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule X-10B-5, which was validly promulgated by the S.E.C.
pursuant to that section." Id. at 786.

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM

court quoted above. Decisions subsequent to TGS evidenced a new
uncertainty as to the need for scienter under the rule. In Heit v.
Weitzen,8 1 the court declined to decide whether there was a scienter
requirement, finding the plaintiff's complaint sufficient either way. In
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 2 the court found that a jury
instruction which did not require an intent to defraud was sufficient
whether the standard was scienter or negligence since the instruction
had required scienter. It is submitted that Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Go.,33 relied on by the Lanza court, did not definitively establish

a scienter requirement either. Shemtob involved a suit against a broker
because of failure to follow instructions, and did not involve any
misrepresentation or concealment whatsoever. Despite strong dictum
concerning scienter 3 4 the holding of Shemtob was narrow, viz., "only
that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief under lOb-5 on the
ground that the suit was a garden-variety customer's suit against a
broker for breach of contract." 35
The Second Circuit has not been alone in determining whether
the negligence or scienter standard applies. While other circuits have
decided that negligence is sufficient, it has very rarely been crucial to
the decisions in those cases. 36 Frequently, the rule is stated in dictum 37
31402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 903 (1969). It was alleged in Heit
that corporate financial statements failed to disclose that a substantial portion of the firm's
income was derived from overcharging on government contracts. Plaintiffs claimed that
in reliance on such misrepresentations, they purchased debentures and common stock of
the corporation and subsequently suffered losses on their investments.
At issue was the sufficiency of the complaint. The court noted that due to TGS, there
was difficulty as to whether "the appropriate standard in a private damage action should
embody a scienter requirement." Id. at 913. However, resolution of the problem was postponed. The complaint had alleged that the defendants knew or should have known of the
misleading statements.
32 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
33 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973).
34 Id. at 445. The court noted that the plaintiff's claim had to be dismissed because
there was an
absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege mere negligence... breach of contract or breach
of a stock exchange rule.... In the absence of any allegation of facts amounting
to fraud or scienter, the claims ... are insufficient ....
Id.
35 479 F.2d at 1319. (Hays, J., dissenting), quoting Schemtob v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1973).
30 See Buckle, Scienter and Rule lOb.5, 67 Nw. U.L. Rav. 562 (1972).
37Id. at 563. For example, the courts discuss the negligence standard in decisions
where actual knowledge on the part of the alleged violators appears clearly to exist. See
Myzel v. Field, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (defendants,
insiders of the corporation, purchased plaintiffs' stock after knowingly misrepresenting
the firm's financial position); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (plaintiff invested in defendant's firm after known false statements were made to him regarding the
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and repeatedly is a prime factor in deciding what statute of limitations
to apply.38 Nevertheless, the widespread acceptance of a negligence
standard, even in cases where there clearly is scienter, shows the tendency on the part of most courts to expand lOb-5 liability to encompass such conduct.
The Ninth Circuit was apparently the earliest to recognize negli3 9 the degence as a basis for liability under lOb-5. In Ellis v. Carter,
fendant claimed that common law fraud was necessary under rule lob-5
In rejecting this contention the court, despite the existence of scienter,
took the opposite extreme and held that the prohibition was against
any "manipulative or deceptive devices," not merely fraudulent deof a middle ground
vices. 40 The court never discussed the possibility
41
requiring scienter but not common law fraud.
The Tenth Circuit claims to have a scienter requirement but in
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 42 and Gilbert v. Nixon 43 defined
it to include negligence. The exact holding of these cases is unclear.
Gilbert stated that there would be liability for negligence but this was
apparently based on the plaintiff's claims under section 12(2) of the
ownership of equipment vital to the firm's operations, the placing in trust of plaintiff's
investment, and an investment by defendant of an equal sum).
38 See, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970). See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
89291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). In holding that the allegations need not speak in
terms of fraud or scienter, the court noted:

Ad.

Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device or contrivance" in contravention of rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the
Commission. It would have been difficult to frame the authority to prescribe
regulations in broader terms. Had Congress intended to limit this authority to
regulations proscribing common-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We
see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word "any", indicating that
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances of whatever kind
may be forbidden, to construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent" devices.
at 294 (emphasis added).
40 Id.

41 See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (churning is
fraud under rule lOb-5 and proof of a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary); Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (material misstatement or omission is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under 1Ob-5, common law fraud is not
necessary). In both of these cases there was scienter if not common law fraud.
42 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). The court noted
that the defendants failed to sustain their burden of proving that they had no knowledge
of the misrepresentation nor that in the exercise of due diligence they could not have
known of the misrepresentation. Based on this standard, the mere absence of scienter
would have been insufficient to relieve the defendants of liability.
43 429 F.2d 848, 357 (10th Cir. 1970). Throughout the opinion, the test used to ascertain the defendant's liability incorporated a negligence standard. The defendant was
forced to prove both that he did not know and that in the exercise of reasonable care he
could not have known of the misrepresentation. Clearly, under such a standard, failure to
exercise reasonable care could result in liability although scienter was absent.
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1983 Act. 4 4 Mitchell involved only a lOb-5 claim but the court quoted
Gilbert and applied the same standard used therein.45 In neither of the
cases was the defendants' conduct merely negligent. A more recent
case, Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,46
held that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof to show both
a duty to disclose and a lack of due care on the part of defendant, and
his own freedom from contributory negligence. 4' This is a clear recognition of the negligence standard.
The Eighth Circuit abrogated the need for scienter in four cases.
In three, the negligence rule was stated in dictum; in the other, it
supported the determination of the appropriate statute of limitations.
In City National Bank of Fort Smith v. Vanderboom, 48 a bank sued
on notes issued by defendants for money lent to an investment corporation of which they were shareholders. The defendants counter-claimed
on the basis of statements allegedly made by the president of the bank
to the effect that he thought the proposed use of the money was a good
investment. The court held that the defendants lacked standing to
raise a lOb-5 claim since the corporation was the purchaser of the
shares. 49 The court, however, held that negligence would be enough
to sustain liability under the rule."° In a companion case, Vanderboom
v. Sexton,8 1 a lOb-5 suit was held barred by the statute of limitations
contained in the Arkansas Blue-Sky Law.5 2 The court applied the
44 Id. at 357.
45 446 F.2d at 102.
40474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
47 Id. at 517. The court noted that a plaintiff as part of its lOb-5 action must exercise
"good faith in its purchase [and] due diligence ....
" Id. It was felt that in making its
purchase, plaintiff had not exercised reasonable care. The earnings statement indicating
the effect of the delays was deemed sufficient to place a reasonable investor on notice as to
corporate difficulties. As such, investigation into the income situation of the firm would
seem prudent. The absence of such reasonable care by the investor effectively destroys his

lOb-5 claim.
48 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970).
49 Id. at 227-28.

50 The court fashioned a two-step test to determine the applicability of lOb-5. In
doing so it noted its substantial agreement with the Second Circuit except to the extent
that the Second Circuit did not recognize a negligence standard. The test formulated
provided:
(1) with regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable investor
.. . would have been entitled to rely upon the misrepresentation. With regard to
nondisclosures, the issue becomes whether a reasonable investor... would have
been entitled to receive full disclosure from the party charged and would have
acted differently had the alleged nondisclosure not occurred. (2) If the plaintiff
satisfies this "in connection with" step fl], it then becomes necessary to determine
whether the defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure was made with scienter
or from a lack of due diligence.
Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
51422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
52 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(e) (1966).
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statute of limitations for the state law which most resembled the 10b-5
claims. It was felt that the Blue-Sky Law resembled lOb-5 more than
did common law fraud because rule lOb-5 applied to "negligent as well
as knowing and intentional misrepresentation." 53
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted a negligence standard for
damages under 10b-5. Kohler v. Kohler Co. 54 involved a claim that the
defendant company should have revealed all the details of its accounting methods to the plaintiff when valuing his shares for the purpose
of buying him out. In holding that the corporation had violated no
duty to plaintiff the court stated that the rule required a corporate
insider "to exercise reasonable and due diligence not only in ascertaining what is material as of the time of the transaction but in disclosing fully those material facts about which the outsider is presumably uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect
his judgment." 55 The court felt that the facts showed an exercise of the
required due diligence.56
Finally, the Lanza court considered the public policy argument,
which was directed to the need for outside directors in corporations
and the possibility of determining the service of such directors should
they be held to too strict a standard under rule l0b-5P7 Judge Hays,
dissenting, felt that Coleman had breached the duty of even an outside
director in his failure to pay any attention at all to corporate affairs.5 s
The impact of Lanza is not entirely clear. Judge Hays in his
dissent stated that
it is not profitable in considering a case such as this merely to
characterize the allegedly unlawful conduct as either negligent or
wilful and to impose liability only if the conduct was wilful ...
The relationship of the parties and the transaction involved must
be analyzed in order to determine whether the Act and the Rule
impose a duty on one party with respect to the other and the nature
of that duty.5 9
Although the majority said that scienter was required under lOb-5,
03422 F.2d at 1238. See also, Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973) (the requirements for a lOb-5 suit include negligence where the issue was whether
the "in connection with" element was satisfied).
54 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
O5Id. at 642.
06 See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 451 F,2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (scienter not
necessary for violation of proxy rules, same requirements apply as in lOb-5 case); Parrent
v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (three-year statute of limitations of
Illinois securities law applied to bar lob-5 action because the absence of a scienter requirement makes it resemble the securities law more than common law fraud).
57479 F.2d at 1306-07.
58 Id. at 1319-20.
59 Id. at 1317,
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they did so only after finding that lOb-5 did not impose a duty to disclose on this outside director. This implies that the court was following
the admonition of Judge Hays. Additionally, a statement by Judge
Moore suggests further that the scienter requirement announced in
Lanza is not the sole test for lOb-5 liability.6 0
The precise holding of Lanza is that a director who is a nonparticipant in a transaction and who personally makes no misrepresentations will not be held liable for mere negligence contributing to the
fraud perpetrated upon the other party to the transaction.
The scienter requirement for liability where the defendant is not
directly involved in the transaction is probably a beneficial rule. The
cases in other circuits which have recognized a standard of negligence
have all concerned persons involved in the unlawful transaction in one
way or another. This is certainly far different from imposing liability
on a director who had nothing whatsoever to do with the wrongful
conduct. Whether the Second Circuit will apply a negligence standard
in circumstances other than those presented here remains to be decided.
INSIDE INFORMATION -

COMMON LAW LIABILITY

Schein v. Chasen
Insider trading in public securities markets has long been subject
to condemnation.1 In order to combat this undesirable practice, Congress has vested the courts and the SEC with a complete arsenal of
weapons. Of primary significance 2 among these is section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 and rule lOb-5 enacted pursuant
60 See note 24 supra.
1 See 2 L. Loss, SECURtIES RGULAT0oN 1037 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].

Such condemnation has not been universal, however. See H. MANNE, INSmER TRADING AND
THE STocK MAmmEr (1966). See also Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. Rxv, 547 (1970), and the authorities cited therein at un,2 & 4, Compare Ferber,
The Case Against Insider Trading: 4 Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. R'v.
621 (1970), with Manne, 4 Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber,23 VAND, L. REv. 627 (1970).
2 Another formidable weapon for dealing with insider trading is section 16(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 US.C. § 78(p)(b) (1970), Liability under section 16(b) is limited to true insiders: directors, officers and controlling (10% or more) shareholders, Any profit made by
such an insider as a result of a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of corporation
securities within a six month period may be recovered by the corporation or by any
security holder on behalf of the company in a quasi-derivative suit. As a streamlined
statute imputing absolute liability, section 16(b) implements the policy that an insider
should not be "playing the market" in his own corporation's securities. See Smolowe v.
DeLendq Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 285-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 US. 751 (1973); Loss, supra
note 1, at 1041 et seq. However, section 16(b) lacks the broad scope of rule 10b.5 and thus
is less effective as a general deterrent to the many varying types of insider trading.
SSection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),
provides:

